This paper considers the problem of matrix completion, when some number of the columns are arbitrarily corrupted, potentially by a malicious adversary. It is well-known that standard algorithms for matrix completion can return arbitrarily poor results, if even a single column is corrupted. What can be done if a large number, or even a constant fraction of columns are corrupted? In this paper, we study this very problem, and develop an efficient algorithm for its solution. Our results show that with a vanishing fraction of observed entries, it is nevertheless possible to succeed in performing matrix completion, even when the number of corrupted columns grows. When the number of corruptions is as high as a constant fraction of the total number of columns, we show that again exact matrix completion is possible, but in this case our algorithm requires many more -a constant fractionof observations. One direct application comes from robust collaborative filtering. Here, some number of users are so-called manipulators, and try to skew the predictions of the algorithm. Significantly, our results hold without any assumptions on the number, locations or values of the observed entries of the manipulated columns. In particular, this means that manipulators can act in a completely adversarial manner.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent work in low-rank matrix completion [3] , [9] , [14] has demonstrated the following remarkable fact: Given a p × n matrix of rank r satisfying some technical assumptions (namely, incoherence -we discuss this in detail below), if its entries are sampled uniformly at random, then with high probability, the solution to a convex and in particular tractable optimization problem yields exact reconstruction of the matrix, when only O((n+p)r log 2 (n+p)) entries are sampled.
Yet as our simulations demonstrate, if even a single column of this matrix is corrupted, the output of these algorithms can be arbitrarily skewed from the true matrix. Partial observation makes a priori identification of corrupted column vs good column, a challenging task. This problem is particularly relevant in so-called collaborative filtering, or recommender systems. Here, based on only partial observation of users' preferences, one tries to give accurate predictions for their unrevealed preferences. It is also well known and well-documented [15] , [34] that such recommender systems are susceptible to manipulation. It is thus of interest to develop efficiently scalable algorithms that can successfully predict preferences of the honest users, while identifying the manipulators. This paper studies this precise problem. We do so by exploiting algebraic structure of the problem: the noncorrupted columns form a low-rank matrix, while the corrupted columns can be seen as a column-sparse matrix. Thus, the mathematical problem we address is to decompose a low-rank matrix from a column-sparse matrix, from only partial observations. Specifically, the problem this paper addresses is as follows. Suppose we are given a partially observed matrix M , and we know that the full matrix can be decomposed as
where L 0 is low-rank and C 0 has only a few non-zero columns. Here both components may have arbitrary magnitude; the rank and column/row space of L 0 as well as the number and positions of non-zero columns of C 0 are unknown. Can we efficiently recover the matrix L 0 on the non-corrupted columns, and also identify the non-zero columns of C 0 ? And, how does the number of corrupted columns impact the number of observations needed?
We provide an affirmative answer to the first question, and provide finite sample performance bounds that move towards answering the second. We give a convex optimization formulation, and sufficient conditions for when this optimization problem yields exact recovery of L 0 , and identification of the corrupted columns. In particular, our results imply the following: if we observe only a vanishing fraction of entries, our convex optimization-based algorithm recovers L 0 exactly even in the face of an increasing number of corrupted columns. If a constant fraction of the columns are corrupted, then our algorithm succeeds in identifying them and recovers L 0 exactly, but now requires a constant fraction of observed entries. We require the locations of the observed entries in the non-corrupted columns (i.e. in L 0 ) to be chosen uniformly at random; significantly however, we do not assume anything about the number or locations of observations for the corrupted columns.
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Motivating Applications
A primary motivation for our investigation is the problem of Robust Collaborative Filtering. In online commerce and advertisement, companies collect user rankings for products and would like to predict user preferences based these incomplete rankings -this is the problem known as collaborative filtering (CF). Most popular in the news is the so-called Netflix problem [27] , but such recommender systems are of increasing popularity and importance in online commerce. There is a large and growing literature on CF; see [1] , [33] and the references therein. Many CF algorithms have been developed (see e.g. [12] , [17] , [18] , [25] , [24] , [23] , [31] ). In many of the settings mentioned (again, most well-known in this category is the Netflix problem) this collaborative filtering problem is usually cast as a matrix completion problem, where one tries to recover a low-rank matrix L 0 from its partially observed entries. However, the quality of prediction may be seriously hampered by (even a small number of) manipulators -potentially malicious users, who calibrate (possibly in a coordinated way) their rankings and the entries they choose to rank in an attempt to skew predictions [34] . In the matrix completion framework, manipulative users correspond to the setting where some of the columns of the matrix M are provided by an adversary. As the ratings of the authentic users correspond to a low-rank matrix, the corrupted ratings correspond to a column-sparse matrix. Therefore, in order to perform collaborative filtering with robustness to manipulation, we need to identify the non-zero columns of C 0 and at the same time recover L 0 , given only a set of incomplete entries. This falls precisely into the scope of our problem. Our robust matrix completion results therefore lead to a provably correct robust CF algorithm. We note that in this paper we assume uniform sampling of the observed entries. This assumption can be relaxed, although we do not provide the details here.
Another motivation is robust Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with partially observed data. In the robust PCA problem [35] , [36] one is given a data matrix, of which most of the columns correspond to authentic data points and lie in a low-dimensional space -the space of principal components. The remaining columns are outliers. The goal is to negate the effect of outliers and recover the principal components. In many situations such as medical research (see e.g. [5] ), the data matrix is only partially observed. Thus the problem of partially observed Robust PCA -recovering the principal components in the face of only partial observations, and also corrupted pointsfalls directly into our framework.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
Suppose there is a p × n data matrix M ; among the n columns, a fraction 1 − γ of them span a r-dimensional subspace of R p , and the remaining γn columns are arbitrarily corrupted. One is given only partial observation of the matrix M , and the goal is to infer the true subspace of the non-corrupted columns and the identities of the corrupted ones. Notice that neither the true subspace nor its dimension r is known, and no restriction is imposed on the corrupted columns except that the total number of them is controlled -they need not follow any probabilistic distributions, and they may be chosen by some adversary who aims to skew one's inference of the non-corrupted columns.
Under the above setup, it is clear that the data matrix M can be decomposed as
Here L 0 is the matrix corresponding to the non-corrupted columns; thus rank(L 0 ) = r and at most (1 − γ)n of the columns of L 0 are non-zero. C 0 is the matrix corresponding to the corrupted columns; thus at most γn of the columns of C 0 are non-zero. Only some of the entries of M are observed. Let
be the set of indices of the observed entries, and P Ω be the orthogonal projection onto the linear subspace of matrices supported on Ω, i.e.,
With this notation, our goal is to exactly recover the column space of L 0 and the locations of the non-zero columns of C 0 , given P Ω (M ).
A. Assumptions
In general, it is not always possible to meet our objective of completing a low-rank matrix in the presence of corrupted columns. Indeed, under some circumstances, there are identifiability issues which makes the problem ill-posed. For example, if one row or column of L 0 is completely unobserved, there is no hope of recovering that row or column. On the other hand, if L 0 has only one non-zero column, it is also impossible to distinguish L 0 from C 0 . Finally, if L 0 has only one non-zero row, recovering L 0 is infeasible unless that particular row is fully observed. To avoid such meaningless situations, we will impose that L 0 satisfy the now standard incoherence condition [3] and observed entries of L 0 are sampled uniformly at random. We note again that we make no assumptions on how the entries of C 0 are sampled, and moreover these entries could be adversarially chosen.
be the ith standard basis. We assume that the matrix L 0 satisfies the following two incoherence conditions, with parameter µ 0 :
Given a small incoherence parameter µ 0 , the condition asserts that the left singular vectors of L 0 are spread out. Without such a condition, matrix completion does not make sense, since it would be possible for the matrix L 0 to also be row-sparse -one cannot hope to recover a row-sparse matrix with sparse observations, even without outliers. Consequently, this is a standard assumption made in the matrix completion literature [3] , [9] , [14] , and µ 0 is likely to be small for many reasonable models [3] . The second condition asserts that the right singular vectors of L 0 are incoherent, and it essentially enforces the condition that the information about the column space of L 0 is spread out among the columns. This condition is important in the face of corrupted columns. If, for instance, a column of L 0 were not in the span of all the other columns, one could not hope to recover it or distinguish it from one of the corrupted columns. This condition is standard in the robust PCA literature, and most practical problems have a very small parameter µ 0 (e.g., [37] ).
For the corrupted columns, we make only one assumption: they are indeed corrupted. That is, we assume only the following. Suppose an oracle were to provide the true column space, U 0 , of the low-rank matrix, L 0 . There would be no way to complete the observed entries of any of the columns of C 0 , so that it lies in the column space of L 0 . If this does not hold, then there is no reasonable way to distinguish a corrupted column from an authentic column. Moreover, such entries will not affect the recovery of the unobserved entries in the authentic columns. In terms of the collaborative filtering application, this is akin to saying that we will only call a user a "manipulator" if the corresponding entries indeed would manipulate the entries of the authentic users. Other than this identifiability requirement, we make no assumptions whatsoever on the corrupted columns. The incoherence assumptions are imposed on the column and row spaces of L 0 , not on M , as are the sampling assumptions, and thus the corrupted columns are not restricted in any way by these. One consequence of this is that we are not able to recover the complete corrupted columns, but we are able to recover their identities.
Sampling Model: Let I 0 ⊂ [n] be the set of indices of the corrupted columns. LetΩ ⊆ [p] × I 0 be the set of indices of observed entries on the non-corrupted columns (i.e. the nonzero columns of L 0 ). We assume that Ω is sampled uniformly random from all size-m subsets of [p] × I 0 (this is sometimes called sampling without replacement); so m is the number of observed entries on the non-corrupted columns. Note that no assumption whatsoever is imposed on the observed entries on the corrupted columns; the adversary may choose to fill in all entries on columns in I 0 or just a fraction of them, and the locations of these observed entries may be chosen randomly or depending on L 0 . On the other hand, as we do not aim at (and there is no hope of) recovering the unobserved entries of C 0 , we can assume without loss of generality that all the unobserved entries of C 0 are zero, i.e., P Ω (C 0 ) = C 0 .
B. Notation and Preliminaries
We provide here a brief summary of the notation used in the paper. We abuse notation by lettingΩ (andΩ c ) be both a set of matrix entries, and also the linear space of matrices supported on these entries; similarly I 0 and I c 0 denote both the set of column indices and the linear space of matrices supported on these columns. For a linear subspace S, P S is the orthogonal projection onto S. The SVD of L 0 is U 0 Σ 0 V 0 . Let P U0 be the projection of each column of a matrix onto the column space of L 0 , given by P U0 (A) = U 0 U 0 A; similarly for the row space P V0 (A) = AV 0 V 0 . We write A ∈ P U0 for any A obeying P U0 (A) = A; i.e., the column space of A is in the column space of U 0 . Similarly A ∈ P V0 denotes P V0 (A) = A. The subspace T 0 is defined as the span of matrices with the same column or row space as L 0 ; thus we have
The complementary operators are defined as usual:
For a vector x, x i is its ith entry. For a matrix A, A i is its ith column and A ij is its (i, j)-th entry. Five matrix norms are used: A * is the nuclear norm (the sum of singular values), A is the spectral/operator norm (the largest singular values), A ∞ is the matrix infinity norm (the largest absolute value of the entries), A 1,2 is the sum of 2 norms of the columns of A, A ∞,2 is the largest 2 norm of the columns of A, and finally A F is the Frobenius norm.
Notation Related to Non-corrupted Columns: Let n 1 = n − |I c 0 | = (1 − γ)n be the number of uncorrupted columns. Let R : I c 0 → R p×n1 be the following linear mapping: given X ∈ I c 0 , remove all its columns in I 0 (which by definition are zero columns), and denote the resulting column truncated matrix as R(X). Note that this is an injection, and thus R −1 is well-defined. (We define R because we frequently need to operate on the I c 0 portion of a matrix that is all zero on I 0 , and we can think of R as simply making the size of the matrix "compatible" with the operation applied to it). Note that by assumption V 0 ∈ I c 0 ; letṼ 0 = R(V 0 ) and The letters η and c and their derivatives (η 1 , c 2 etc.) denote unspecified constants that are, however, universal in that they are independent of p, n, γ, m and r.
A summary of the notation: 
T
The span of matrices with the same row or column space asL (defined later).
I
The column support ofĈ (defined later).
III. MAIN RESULTS AND CONSEQUENCES
The main result of this paper says that despite the corrupted columns, despite the partial observation, we can nevertheless simultaneously recover L 0 , the non-corrupted columns, and identify I 0 , the position of the corrupted columns, as long as the the number of corrupted columns and unobserved entries are controlled. Moreover, this can be achieved efficiently by solving a tractable convex program. Our algorithm is as follows.
Algorithm 1 Manipulator Pursuit
subject to
We say our algorithm succeeds if we always have
, and I = I 0 . We recall our single restriction on the corrupted columns: they are indeed corrupted, in that they cannot be completed so as to lie in the column space of the true matrix L 0 -failing this, asking for I 0 to be recovered does not make sense, nor is it even clear why such a column should be called "corrupted."
A. Main Theorems
Our first main theorem states that under some natural conditions, our algorithm exactly recovers the non-corrupted columns and the identities of the corrupted columns with high probability. Here and in what that follows, by with high probability, we mean with probability at least 1 − cn −5 for some constant c > 0. Recall that ρ is the fraction of observed entries on the non-corrupted columns and γ is the fraction of corrupted columns. Theorem 1. Suppose n 1 ≥ p ≥ 32 and r ≤r, γ ≤γ, ρ ≥ ρ. If (r,γ, ρ) satisfies
where η 1 and η 2 are absolute constants, then with high probability Algorithm 1 with λ = 1 48 ρ γrµ0n log 2 (4n1) strictly succeeds. Remark. Notice the theorem does not require any assumption on the observed entries on the corrupted columns. In the case of collaborative filtering, a malicious user can choose to rate any subset of products in an arbitrary way. Also notice that to choose λ, one does not need to know the exact values of ρ, γ, and r, but rather bounds on them.
We give three corollaries to illustrate the consequences of Theorem 1.
succeeds with high probability. Remark. Notice that the choice λ is universal and does not depende on any unknown quantity. In the case of p = Θ(n 1 ), we can recover the non-corrupted columns with a vanishing fraction of entries observed and a growing number of corrupted columns. , then Algorithm 1 with λ = µ0r log 2 (4n1) √ n succeeds with high probability if
Remark. With a constant fraction of entries observed, the fraction of corrupted columns can be as large as one over a polylog factor. If ρ = 1, we partially recover the result in [36] . Remark. This (partially) recovers the matrix completion result in [4] , [28] , [9] .
Benign Corruptions: Recall that thus far, the corrupted columns are not subject to any restrictions. In particular, the incoherence conditions are not imposed on C 0 , and the number and locations of the observed entries on the corrupted columns can be arbitrary. If the corruptions C 0 are not entirely adversarial, however, and in fact satisfy some additional assumptions, then we can do better: the condition on γ is weaker, and the polylog factor can be eliminated. This is stated in the following theorem. Theorem 2. Suppose n 1 ≥ p ≥ 32 and γ ≤γ. In addition, assume that the entries on the corrupted columns are fully observed, and the left singular vectors of the full matrix M (and not only those of L 0 ) denoted by U M , satisfy the following incoherence condition: max
If (r,γ, ρ) satisfies
where η 1 and η 2 are absolute constants, then wth high probability Algorithm 1 with λ = 1 4 √γ n strictly succeeds. Remark. If p scales linearly with n 1 , then we have no polylog gap. In particular, we can recover the non-corrupted columns L 0 exactly, in the presence of a constant fraction of corrupted columns, given a constant fraction of observations.
B. Connections to Prior Work and Innovation
In the matrix completion problem, one seeks to recover a low rank matrix from a small number of its entries. It has recently been shown that by using convex optimization [3] , [4] , [9] , [28] or singular value thresholding [14] , one can exactly recover an n × n rank-r matrix with high probability from as few as O(nrpoly log n) entries. Our paper extends this line of work and shows that even if the observed entries on some columns are completely corrupted (by possibly adversarial noise), one can still recover the non-corrupted columns as well as the identity of the corrupted columns.
The centerpiece of our algorithm is a convex optimization problem, that is a convex proxy to a very natural (but intractable) algorithm for such recovery, namely, finding a low-rank matrix L and a column-sparse matrix C consistent with the observed data. Such convex surrogates for rank and support functions have been used extensively in vector problems and low-rank matrix problems (e.g., [8] , [29] , and more closely related to our topic of interest, matrix completion papers, e.g., [4] , [9] , [28] ) and matrix decomposition papers [2] , [6] . Our analysis also adapts important ideas from the previous literature, especially the ideas of dual certification and Golfing Scheme in [3] , [9] .
Besides the obvious difference in the problem setup, our paper also departs from the previous work in terms of mathematical analysis. In particular, in all the above works, the intended outcome is known a priori -their goal is to output a matrix or a pair of matrices, exactly equal to the original one(s). In our setting, however, the optimal solution of the convex problem is in general neither the original low rank matrix L 0 nor the matrix C 0 which consists of only the corrupted columns. This critical difference requires a novel analysis that builds on the method of the "Oracle Problem" introduced in [36] .
Our work is also related to the problem of separating a low-rank matrix and an overall sparse matrix from their (possibly partially observed) sum, with sufficient condition for successful recovery provided [2] , [6] . Compared to this line of work, our results indicate that separation is still possible even if the low-rank matrix is added with a column-sparse matrix instead of an overall sparse matrix. Moreover, although we don't pursue in this paper, our techniques allow us to establish results on separating three components -a low rank matrix, an overall sparse matrix, and a column-sparse matrix.
The presence of (randomly) missing entries and corrupted columns -and thus dealing with three matrix structures simultaneously -requires the introduction of new ingredients. In particular, one important technical innovation requires the development of new bounds on the · ∞,2 norms of certain random matrices.
IV. PROOFS OF MAIN THEOREMS
In this section we prove our main theorems. The first five subsections are devoted to the proof of Theorem 1, while the last one proves Theorem 2.
The proof is quite technical, and requires a number of intermediate results.
To clarify the exposition, and also to provide a high-level roadmap of what we do and why we do it, we first outline the main steps of the proof in Section IV-A. The proof itself is contained in Sections IV-B to IV-E. Then in Section IV-F, we show that under additional assumption of the outliers, the proof of the dual certificate can be simplified, and stronger recovery result can be obtained, namely Theorem 2.
A. Skeleton of the Proof
In this section we provide a proof-skeleton of our main theorem. The full proof details are given in the subsequent sections. The main roadmap to proving a convex optimization problem recovers a desired solution, is to demonstrate that with high probability, one can find a dual certificate of optimality of the desired solution. This basic recipe underlies many of the proofs in sparse recovery and low-rank recovery [2] , [3] , [6] . A central roadblock to this approach is that unless the adversary's corrupted columns happen to be perfectly perpendicular to the column space of the true low-rank matrix, the convex optimization problem given will not precisely recover L 0 . The reason is simple: if the corrupted columns have a non-perpendicular component, then some part of that will be put into the L matrix the optimization recovers. Algorithmically, this matter is irrelevant: as long as the corrupted columns are identified, and the recovered L matches the desired L 0 on the non-corrupted columns, our objective is met, and the problem is solved. The analysis, however, is significantly complicated, since because we do not recover L 0 exactly, we no longer explicitly know for what to write a certificate of optimality.
Beyond this, significant challenges arise because of the simultaneous presence of three matrix structures: lowrank, matrix-sparse, and column-sparse. This requires a number of additional innovations. The six main steps of the proof are as follows.
Step 1. The first step is quite standard in the matrix completion literature. It says that with high probability, under the sampling regime of the stated results, the sampling operator P Ω0 on the non-corrupted columns, is invertible on the span of matrices with either the same column or row space as L 0 . Without such a result, matrix completion under any algorithm would be hopeless. We note that in our case, we cannot make any statements about the operator P Ω which involves sampling on the corrupted columns, since we make no assumptions on the distribution of the samples on the corrupted columns. The result we prove below, essentially says the following: when m > 64 3 µ 0 r(n 1 + p)β log(n 1 + p), (as we require in our main theorems), then with high probability,
We refer to this condition repeatedly in what follows.
Step 2. For the algorithm to succeed, it is sufficient for the recovered pair (L * , C * ) to have the right column space and correct non-corrupted columns for L * , and the right column support for C * . To identify such a solution, we consider the following Oracle Problem; here Γ denotes the space of matrices supported on the set of all entries in the non-corrupted columns plus the observed entries in the corrupted columns.
The Oracle Problem is feasible, since the true pair (L 0 , C 0 ) is feasible. Let (L,Ĉ) denote the solution to the Oracle Problem. We must identify conditions that a dual certificate must satisfy to guarantee that (L,Ĉ) is an optimal solution to Algorithm 1, and that any optimal solution to Algorithm 1 must also have the correct column space and column support.
Step 3. To state these conditions, we need some definitions.
UΣV := the singular value decomposition ofL
It is now straightforward to demonstrate thatQ is a dual certificate as long as it satisfies the following:
We construct a certificateQ ∈ Ω, by first constructing a certificate, Q, that satisfies (b) through (e), and then sampling it according to Ω and scaling appropriately. We then use concentration inequalities to show that the sampling procedure is "close enough" to the identity map. Following this program requires some care. In particular, the equality constraint in (b) must be relaxed, since the concentration inequalities can only guarantee that it is approximately satisfied with high probability. This is done in the next step.
Step 4. Consider any feasible perturbation, (L + ∆ 1 ,Ĉ + ∆ 2 ). Given aQ that satisfies properties (a) − (e) above, it is immediate to show that (L + ∆ 1 ,Ĉ + ∆ 2 ) is suboptimal:
Condition (b) above, PT (Q) −ÛV = 0, comes from the need to show that the above inequality holds for all values of the perturbation, ∆ 1 , and in particular, its projection onto PT , the column and row space ofL. However, ∆ 1 cannot be arbitrary. Lemma 1. Suppose ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ∈ R p×n are feasible perturbations, i.e., they satisfy P Ω (∆ 1 ) + P Ω (∆ 2 ) = 0. Then under the sampling regime in the above results, the condition (7) holds with high probability, and we have
Then, since ∆ 1 cannot be arbitrary, the equality of condition (b) can be relaxed. This leads to alternative conditions thatQ must satisfy. Proposition 1 (Alternative Dual Certificate Condition). Suppose λ < 1. Then with high probability, under the sampling regime of the results, the condition (7) holds, and (L,Ĉ) is an optimal solution to (1) if there existsQ such that
If both inequalities are strict, and
, and P I0∩Ω (C ) = C , which means Algorithm 1 succeeds.
Step 5. The next step requires constructing a dual certificate Q, that satisfies properties (b) − (e), and also (b )−(e ). Ignoring the requirement of (a), essentially allows us to consider the fully observed problem of separating a low-rank matrix from a column-sparse matrix -a substantially more manageable problem. The Q that we obtain satisfies all constraints except for (a), and thus is the Q that we then sample. The sampling procedure is described next.
Step 6. The final step requires us to sample Q to obtainQ, and then show using concentration inequalities, that the resultingQ satisfies (a ) − (e ) with high probability. The naive approach does not quite work, and thus requires a different sampling scheme. We do this using a modification of the approach coined "The Golfing Scheme" [9] , [10] . We sample Ω by a modified batched sampling-with replacement scheme. The final step requires showing that Bernstein's inequality still holds under this scheme (since the sampled entries are no longer all independent).
The Oracle Problem approach, the conditions on ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 in the Lemma above, the alternative conditions for the certificate that we present here, and the validation of our choice of the certificate, are new. Moreover, because our objective involves a · 1,2 -term, our results require us to obtain new concentration results for the dual · ∞,2 bound, that are previously not known (at least to us).
B. Proof of Alternative Dual Certificate Conditions
In this Section, we prove the alternative dual certificate conditions given in Proposition 1. The main idea is simple: The equality constraint of the condition (b), namely, PT (Q) −ÛV = 0, comes from considering a perturbation (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ), where ∆ 1 has arbitrary projection onto the space PT . However, we need only consider feasible perturbations, i.e., pairs (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ) that satisfy P Ω (∆ 1 ) + P Ω (∆ 2 ) = 0. We show that any such pair need obey an additional constraint on PT (∆ 1 ), as given above in Lemma 1. This then allows us to replace the equality constraint of (b) by the inequality in (b ). Now for the details.
The first result is quite standard in the matrix completion literature, and at some level indicates why matrix completion from a small collection of entries is even possible. It says, essentially, that in the space T 0 of matrices with the same column or row space as the low-rank matrix L 0 , the sampling operator PΩ causes no loss of information, i.e., it is invertible. More specifically, the result bounds the operator norm of
The proof follows that of [28, Theorem 3.4] . The only difference is that [28, Theorem 3.4] assumes sampling with replacement, while we assume sampling without replacement, which does not cause a problem as recently shown in [11] .
] is a set of m 0 entries sampled uniformly at random without replacement. Then for all β > 1,
with probability at least 1 − 2 max{n 1 , p} 2−2β provided that m 0 > 16 3 µ 0 r(n 1 + p)β log(n 1 + p) . Remark. In particular, when m > 64 3 µ 0 r(n 1 + p)β log(n 1 + p), which is satisfied under the assumption of our main theorems, we have w.h.p. that the condition (7) given above, holds:
and thus PT 0 PΩPT 0 is invertible onT 0 . We will make use of this result throughout the paper.
The next three lemmas prove some important properties of (L,Ĉ), as well as the column and row spaces of L and L 0 . Indeed, one of the challenges of developing a certificate for the solution to the Oracle Problem, is that we must relate properties ofL,Û andV , to properties of L 0 , and in particular U 0 and V 0 . We use these lemmas repeatedly in the sequel. Lemma 3 is an analog of [37, Lemmas 4 and 5] .
,Î ⊆ I 0 , and there exists orthnormal V ∈ R n×r and invertible N ∈ R r×r such that
Proof: By definition of the oracle problem, we have P Γ (L +Ĉ) = P Γ (L 0 + C 0 ). Applying P I c 0 to both sides of the equality and noticing that L 0 ∈ I c 0 , C 0 ,Ĉ ∈ I 0 , we obtain P I c 0 (L) = L 0 . Then everything except the last equality can be proved in excatly the same way as in [37, Lemma 4, 5] . Now for the last equality in the lemma. There exists someĤ such thatĤ ∈ Ω ∩ G(Ĉ) and
Proof: The proof is almost identical to that of [37, Lemma 6] . Since (L,Ĉ) is an optimal solution to the Oracle Problem, by convex analysis there exists Q 1 , Q 2 , A , and B such that
where Q 1 , Q 2 are subgradients to L * and to λ Ĉ . This means that Q 1 =ÛV + Z 1 = U 0V + Z 1 for some Z 1 ∈ PT ⊥ and Q 2 = λ(Ĥ + Z 2 ) for someĤ ∈ G(Ĉ) and Z 2 ∈ I c 0 . Let A = Z 1 + A , B = λZ 2 + B , we haveÛV
Notice thatĤ ∈ I 0 and λĤ + P I c 0 (B) ∈ Γ implyĤ ∈ Ω. Applying P U0 P I0 to the above equality gives the equality (13) .
Finally, we have the following simple technical lemma, which manipulates the operators PT
, R and R −1 . This lemma in particular, is used repeatedly below.
Lemma
PT
Proof: For the first equality, we have
where we use Lemma 3.
The second equality is given by
The third equality is given by
where we make use of the second equality. The next step is important -we now prove Lemma 1 stated above, showing that if ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 are feasible perturbations, then PT (∆ 1 ) must satisfy an additional constraint. Using this, we are then able to relax the equality constraint of the certificate, to an inequality. As pointed out earlier, the idea of obtaining conditions for a dual certificate with relaxed equality constraint, have appeared earlier, first in [9] and then also in [2] , [28] . The following constraints, however, are new, as are the relaxed dual certificate constraints. We restate Lemma 1 here. Lemma 1. Suppose ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ∈ R p×n are feasible perturbations, i.e., they satisfy P Ω (∆ 1 ) + P Ω (∆ 2 ) = 0. When Eq.(7) holds, we have
Proof: We have following chain of inequalities
On the other hand, R P I c 0 PT (∆ 1 ) ∈T 0 by the first equality in Lemma 5. It follows that
where the last inequality uses Eq. (7). Collecting these facts, we obtain
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof: (of Proposition 1) The first part of the proof (the proof of non-strict success) is standard. To prove (L,Ĉ) is optimal to (1), we need to show that any other feasible solution (L + ∆ 1 ,Ĉ + ∆ 2 ) with P Ω (∆ 1 ) + P Ω (∆ 2 ) = 0 can not have a objective value lower than that of (L,Ĉ).
, and P I0 (Q) + λW 2 is a subgradient of λ Ĉ 1, 2 . Notice that
Therefore, we have
≥ 0, where inequality (1) follows by the definition of subgradient, equality (2) follows due to the fact thatQ ∈ Ω, inequality (3) uses the property of dual norms, inequality (4) follows from Lemma 1, and finally inequality (5) uses the assumption of the proposition at hand. Therefore, (L,Ĉ) is an optimal solution. Now suppose both (b ) and (d) are strict. If the last inequality is strict, then (L,Ĉ) is the unique optimal solution. Otherwise, we must have
Since P Ω (∆ 1 ) = −P Ω (∆ 2 ) and ∆ 2 ∈ I 0 , we have 
and thus
is an optimal solution, we must have ∆ 2 ∈ Ω; otherwise (L + ∆ 1 ,Ĉ + P Ω (∆ 2 )) will have strictly lower objective value. Putting all together, we conclude that for (L + ∆ 1 ,Ĉ + ∆ 2 ) to be optimal, we must have ∆ 1 ∈ I 0 ∩ P U0 , ∆ 2 ∈ I 0 ∩ Ω, and 
C. Technical Lemmas
In this sub-section we collect several technical lemmas, which are required for constructing the dual certificate. These lemmas bound the norms of certain random operators/matrices.
Our basic tool for bounding matrix norms is the Noncommutative Bernstein inequality. The version presented below is from [28] , except that here we assume the sampling without replacement model; this is possible because it has been shown that the Noncommutative Bernstein Inequality still holds under this model [11] . 
Remark. Observe that the right hand side is less than
The next lemma states that for a fixed matrix inT 0 , the operator 
with probability at least 1 − 2 max{n 1 , p} 2−β provided that m 0 > 8 3 βµ 0 r(n 1 + p) log(n 1 + p). The next lemma bounds the operator norm of pn1 m PΩ(Z) − Z with the infinity norm of Z. Again one can adapt the proof in [28] to the sampling without replacement model.
] is a set of m 0 entries sampled uniformly at random without replacement and let Z be a fixed p × n 1 matrix. Then for all β > 1,
with probability at least 1 − (n 1 + p) 1−β . provided that m 0 > 6β min{n 1 , p} log(n 1 + p).
The bounds in the next two lemmas are new. The first one states that for a fixed matrix inT 0 , the operator 
with probability at least 1 − (2n 1 ) 2−2β .
The next lemma states that the operator pn1 m PΩ dos not increase the infinity-two norm of a matrix whose column space is the same as U 0 . The proof is given in Appendix B.
] is a set of m 0 entries sampled uniformly at random without replacement. For any matrix Z ∈ R n×r , we have
with probability at least 1 − (n 1 + p) 2−2β provided m 0 ≥ 64 3 βµ 0 r(n 1 + p) log(n 1 + p).
D. Constructing the Dual Certificate via the Golfing Scheme
In this section, we construct the dual certificate, which builds on the dual certificate used in [37] and utilizes the Golfing Scheme.
Recall that Lemma 4 guarantees the existence of anĤ satisfying Eq.(13). Following [37] , let
and let ψ = P I0 (V ) P I0 (V ) . By [37, Proof of Theorem 4], when ψ < 1, the following holds.
3) P I0 (Q) = λĤ;
This dual certificate Q, satisfies all the conditions in Proposition 1 except the requirement of being in Ω. Moreover, this requirement can only potentially fail on the columns in I 0 . Thus, there is a natural candidate solution: buildQ identical to Q on the columns in I 0 , and for the columns I We may then use matrix concentration inequalities to show that with high probability,Q itself satisfies the required conditions. Note that not requiring the random part ofQ, namely, P I c 0 (Q), to satisfy any equality constraints, is critical (whence the need for the alternative sufficient conditions of Proposition 1.
The details are slightly more complicated, and require us to use the Golfing Scheme to construct the desired dual certificate. For technical reasons, we need to modify our sampling model as follows. 2 Sampling with batch replacement model: We assume thatΩ consists of s batch of entries sampled from the I c columns, with each batch of size q, where the sampling operation proceeds as follows. We draw the first batch Ω 1 of q entries uniformly random from [p] × [n 1 ] without replacement. Then we replace all the entries in the first batch and draw the second batchΩ 2 of q entries independently of the first batch. We repeat this procedure for s times. In this way, we obtain a total of m = q × s (perhaps non-distinct) entriesΩ = s i=1Ω i . Notice that every single batch contains distinct elements, while the batches are independent of each other.
In Appendix C, we argue the following: if there exists a dual certificate with high probability under the sampling with batch replacement model, then the probability that there exists a dual certificate under the sampling without replacement model with the same m can only be higher. Therefore, we only need to construct the dual certificate under the sampling with batch replacement model.
Since by assumption m = ρpn 1 satisfies
we may choose s = 2 · 
Notice that under the above construction, P I0 (Q) = P I0 (Q). Thus we are using the Golfing Scheme only for the I c 0 part of Q. We show now thatQ is the desired dual certificate, i.e., satisfying the conditions of success in Proposition 1.
To simplify the subsequent presentation, we introduce one more piece of notation and define
We collect below several inequalities which will be used in the proof of the dual certificate. (These inequalities are just condensed form of Lemma 2 and Lemma 7-10.) Let c denote some constant sufficiently large, and suppose ρ obeys the lower bound in Theorem 1 with a sufficiently large η 1 . By Lemma 2 the following holds w.h.p. for each i,
By Lemma 7 the following holds w.h.p. for each i and any Z ∈T ,
By Lemma 8 the following holds w.h.p. for each i and any Z,
By Lemma 9 the following holds w.h.p. for each i and any Z ∈T ,
By Lemma 10 the following holds w.h.p. for each i.
Also notice that
. We are ready to show thatQ satisfies the condition of success. Proposition 2. If n 1 ≥ 32, m satisfies Eq. (18), and λ satisfies
for some c 1 and c 2 sufficiently small, then the certificateQ constructed above satisfies (a)Q ∈ Ω, and satisfies the remaining conditions of Proposition 1 with high probability:
Proof: We know thatĤ ∈ Ω by Lemma 4, and Y s ∈ Ω by construction. ThereforeQ = λĤ + R −1 (Y s ) ∈ Ω. Denote I c 0 = R P I c 0 Q . We first derive an equality which we make use of in the rest of the proof. For i = 1, 2, . . . , s, we have
where the last equality is by recursion. Also notice that by our assumption on λ, we have λ √ γn ≤ 
Step 1:
. By the second equality of Lemma 5, we have PT
where the last equality uses the properties of Q. The rest of this step is standard when one uses the Golfing scheme. Recall that we wantQ to be close toÛV onT , and notice that
) can viewed as the "error" after the i iterations of the Golfing Scheme. The proof consists of showing that the error decreases geometrically at each iteration. Indeed, we have
Here, inequality (1) uses Eq.(19), inequality (2) is due to [37, Proof of Theorem 4,
Step 5], and inequality (3) is proved in Step 4 below. Since s = 2 · 5 4 log(4n 1 ), and √ ρ ≥ 1 2n1 , the last line is bounded as
Step 2: Modulo some technical issues, and some previously established facts from [37] , this step is also standard when one uses the Golfing Scheme; the key is showing PT ⊥ 0 (Y s ) is small. Notice that
where the last equality uses the third equality in Lemma 5. Therefore, we have:
We bound each of the four terms on the right hand side, separately. By [37, Lemma 2] , the first term is bounded as λĤ ≤ λ √ γn ≤ 1 80 . The second term can be bounded using results from Step 1:
where (a) is due to µ 0 ≤ n1 r and (b) is due to n 1 ≥ 32. (1) and (2) below, where we bound · with · ∞ using Lemma 8, and then bound · using Lemma 7; these are where we need theΩ i 's to be independent of each other.
Here, inequality (a) follows from Eq. (21), inequality (b) from Eq.26 and (20), and inequality (c) from the incoherence assumption and the following inequalities (similar to [37, Proof of Theorem 7,
Step 5]):
Finally (d) is due to our choice λ.
The fourth term can be bounded in a way similar to [37, Theorem 7,  Step 4] as follows.
where (a) follows from [37, Theorem 7,
Step 4]. Collecting the bounds for the four terms, we have
Step 3: Using the properties of Q, we have P I0 (Q) = P I0 (Q) = λĤ ∈ λG(Ĉ).
Step 4: We have
We bound the three terms on the right hand side separately. (The reason for doing this is that higher order terms in the above sum are easier to bound, so we need to isolate the first two terms in order to get tighter bounds.) The new inequalities we derive on the · ∞,2 norm, are critical here. We bound the first term using Lemma 10. We have:
Here, inequality (a) is due to Eqs. (23) and (31) . In the first equality above, one might be tempted to write The second term is bounded using Lemma 9. We have:
Here, (b) is due to Eq. (20) and (22), and (c) follows from the incoherence assumption and [37, Proof of Theorem 7,
Step 5]. Again, bounding the "U 0V I c 0 part" and the "PT 0 R(Λ 2 ) part" separately in (a) gives a better bound. The third term is of high order and thus easier to control than the first two terms. It suffices to use the loose bound · ∞,2 ≤ √ p · ∞ . We have:
where (a) follows from Eq. (20) (here we use the independence between theΩ i 's again), and (b) is due to the fact that c 1
. Collecting the bounds for the three terms, we have
In this case we can choose λ = 1 48 ρ γnµ 0r log 2 (4n 1 ) .
Combing the above discussion with Lemma 2, Propositions 1 and 2, and the union bound, concludes the proof of our main result, Theorem 1.
F. When can we eliminate the polylog gap?
In this section, we prove Theorem 2, which states that the polylog gap can be eliminated under additional assumptions on the corrupted columns. The bounds in Theorem 2 are stronger than those in Theorem 1, and the proof is simpler.
In Theorem 2, we assume that the corrupted columns too satisfy the same incoherence condition as the noncorrupted columns:
where U M is the left singular vectors of M . Since the nonzero columns of L 0 is a subset of the columns of M , we have Range(P U0 ) ⊆ Range(P U M ), and thus P U M can be decomposed as
Observe that the incoherence of P U M implies that of P U ⊥ C ; that is
Let us focus on the jth column ofĈ andĤ; w.l.o.g. we assumeĈ j = 0. BecauseĈ = L 0 +C 0 −L andL ∈ P U0 , the column space ofĈ is a subspace of Range(P U M ). Therefore we can writeĈ
C y for some column vectors x ∈ R r and y ∈ R rc . It follows that
. Thus we can bound the ith component of
where in (1) we use U ⊥ C y 2 = y 2 and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since i and j are arbitrary, it follows that
Thus, for any (a, b) we have
and subsequently
With the bound Eq.(33) on the matrix infinity norm of PT 0 (Λ 2 ), we can derive tighter bounds in the proof of the dual certificate.
First, we use a dual certificate that is slightly more "economical" than the one we used before.
we may partitionΩ into s partitions of size q such that s = 5 log(4n 1 )/ log(p), and q = m/s ≥ c 1 n 1 √ pr 2 log(4n 1 ). LetQ be defined as before except that s and q now have different values.
With this choice ofQ and the new bound (33), Proposition 2 now becomes Proposition 3. If n 1 ≥ 32, and λ satisfies
for some η sufficiently small, thenQ ∈ Ω, and the following holds with high probability
Proof: The proof is based on that of Proposition 2 with only minor modifications; we will point out where modifications are needed. We will refer to the proof of Proposition 2 as the "previous proof".
Similar to the previous proof, we have λ √ γn ≤ Step 1: (29) in the previous proof becomes
Step 2 : When the bound (33) holds, Eq.(30) in the previous proof is bounded by
where the last inequality holds due to our assumption on λ.
Step 3 : No modification is needed.
Step 4 : In the previous proof, we write
as three terms and bound them separately. In the current case, it turns out that they can be bounded all at once. We have
where (1) is due to Eq. (20) . Solving, we find
Algorithm 2 The ALM Algorithm for Robust Matrix Completion input:
In the last proposition, we require λ satisfies condition (34) . Following similar lines in section IV-E, such λ exists if γ ≤γ withγ
for some η 2 sufficiently small. In this case, we can take
This proves Theorem 2.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATIONS
To facilitate fast and efficient solution, we use a family of algorithms called Augmented Lagrange Multiplier (ALM) methods (see e.g., [16] ), shown to be effective on problems involving nuclear norm minimization. We have adapted this method to our · * + λ · 1,2 -type problem; see Algorithm 2.
Here L (S) is the entry-wise soft-thresholding operator: if |S ij | ≤ , then set it to zero, otherwise, let S ij := S ij − S ij / |S ij |. Similarly, C (C) is the column-wise soft-thresholding operator: if C i 2 ≤ , then set it to zero, otherwise let C i := C i − C i / C i 2 . In our experiments, we choose u 0 = M 1,2
and α = 1.1, and the criterion for convergence is
The first set of experiments demonstrates the power of the manipulator, as we show that even a single adversarially corrupted column can arbitrarily skew the prediction of standard matrix completion algorithms. In our experiments, we fix n = p = 400, and γ = 1/400. For different ρ and r, we generate the low-rank matrix L 0 by forming the product L 0 = AB . The matrices A ∈ R p×r and B ∈ R n(1−γ)×r , have i.i.d. standard Gaussian entries. The single corrupted column C 0 ∈ R p×1 is chosen identical to first column of L 0 except for the last entry, which is assigned a large value (10 in our experiments). (In Collaborative Filtering this corresponds to a manipulator trying to promote the last movie.) The set of observed entries in the uncorrupted columns is chosen uniformly at random from all subsets of
and Ω are then given as input. We apply both our algorithm and standard nuclear-norm-based matrix completion. As shown in Figure 1 , standard matrix completion fails essentially for all values of ρ and r, while our algorithm is almost unaffected. Here for each pair of (ρ, γ) we run the experiment for 5 times, and plot the frequency of success. Our figures show the number of successes by grayscale, where white denotes all success and black denotes all failure.
Next, we investigate our algorithm's performance under different numbers of corrupted columns, and neutral and adversarial corruption. In the first case, each entry of C 0 is i.i.d. Gaussian. In the second case, the corrupted columns are constructed as follows. For 1 ≤ i ≤ γn, corrupted column i copies the observed entries of clean column i and fills other entries with i.i.d. Gaussian noise. We fix r = 10 and vary (ρ, γ). In both cases, each entry in C 0 is observed with probability ρ independently. Other settings are the same as in the first set of experiments. The results for our algorithm and standard matrix completion are shown in the left and right panes of Figure 2 for the first corruption scheme, and in Figure 3 for the second corruption scheme. Comparison to Low-rank Plus Sparse. When only a small fraction of the entries are observed, the corrupted columns P Ω (C 0 ) can be viewed as a sparse matrix. Therefore, to separate L 0 from P Ω (C 0 ), one might think it is possible to apply the techniques in [2] , [6] , which decompose a low-rank matrix and a sparse matrix from their sum. In particular, given input P Ω (M ), one attempts to decompose it by solving the following convex program:
Our approach specifically deals with corrupted columns, in order to deal with persistent corruption. It is no surprise that using the above algorithm instead should not be successful. Indeed, this is the case, and we illustrate this numerically in Figures 2 and 3 , using the same synthetic data described above.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we provide an efficient algorithm for matrix completion, when some number of the columns are arbitrarily corrupted. As our computational results show, ignoring the outliers can have severe consequences, with even a single corrupted column jeopardizing the recovery of the low-rank matrix. Similarly, other approaches dealing with corruption in matrix completion, in particular those considering matrix-sparse (as opposed to columnsparse) corruption, are not able to handle the presence of corrupted columns. Our results give sufficient conditions for number of samples needed versus the number of columns corrupted, to enable recovery. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first results along these lines. That said, improving these bounds, and also proving lower bounds, seems to be an important future direction.
Our results make no assumptions on the corrupted columns, or on the elements of those columns that are revealed. In particular, both the revealed entries and their values can be arbitrarily (potentially maliciously) chosen. One arena of application of these results, is the problem of robust collaborative filtering. Our results provide an efficient algorithm for efficient collaborative filtering, impervious to the effect of malicious or manipulative users.
In this paper we have assumed uniform sampling on the authentic columns. Although we do not provide the details here, this assumption can be relaxed to other sampling distributions. Finally, we note that the results presented here enable the matrix decomposition into a low-rank, sparse, and column spare matrix.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 9
In this section we use (v) i to denote the ith component of a vector v. One observes that by assumption,
for all i. Therefore, we have
We repeat the lemma below for convenience.
] is a set of m 0 entries sampled uniformly at random without replacement. For any Z ∈T 0 and β > 1, we have
Proof: Sample (a, b) uniformly at random without replacement. Define ξ = e a e b , PT
We now compute the second moment. i 's are copies of ξ i sampled without replacement. We are ready to use the Noncommutative Bernstein Inequality to bound the probability with probability at least 1 − (2n 1 ) 2−2β .
B. Proof of Lemma 10
We need the following straightforward lemma, whose proof is omitted. Lemma 11. For any two matrices A and B, we have A, B ≤ A 1,2 B ∞,2 .
Now we proceed to prove Lemma 10. We repeat the lemma below for convenience. Lemma. Suppose Ω 0 ∈ [p] × [n 1 ] is a set of m 0 entries sampled uniformly at random without replacement. For any matrix Z ∈ R n×r , we have e a e b − 1 pn1 U 0Z , then for 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 , the ith column of ξ is ξ i = e a e b , U 0Z e a e b e i − Note that PΩ(U 0Z ) − By union bound, we have
≤ (1 + p)n 1 (n 1 + p)
−2β
≤ (n 1 + p)
2−2β
Therefore, with probability at least 1 − (n 1 + p) 2−2β ,
C. Sampling with batch replacement
In this section we argue that if a dual certificate exists with high probability under the sampling with batch replacement (SWBR) model, then the probability that a dual certificate exists under the sampling without replacement (SWoR) model with the same number of observations m can only be higher. The argument follows the same spirit as [11] . Suppose under the sampling with batch replacement model, we sample for a total of m = s × q times and obtain a set ofm ≤ m distinct entries.
Recall that in Section IV-D, we prove that under the following set of (deterministic) conditions
• c < 1,
• n 1 ≥ 32,
• λ satisfies Eq.24,
Q is a dual certificate with high probability under SWBR. Then under SWoR the probability that a dual certificate exists is at least as high. This is because P SWBR Q is a dual certificate There is one more subtlety here. When we write P SWBR Q is a dual certificate |m = i , the randomnese comes not only from the locations of them distinct entries, but also from how thesem entries are allocated to the s batches in the Golfing Scheme. On the other hand, for P SWBR [a dual certificate exists in the space spanned by them distinct entries |m = i] , the only randomnese is the locations of them entries. However, the following relation still holds:
P SWBR Q is a dual certificate |m = i ≤ P SWBR [a dual certificate exists in the space spanned by them distinct entries |m = i] as can be shown by a straightforward counting argument.
